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Abstract—Small-Cells are deployed in order to enhance the
network performance by bringing the network closer to the
user. However, as the number of low power nodes grows in-
creasingly, the overall energy consumption of the Small-Cells
base stations cannot be ignored. A relevant amount of energy
could be saved through several techniques, especially power
control mechanisms. In this paper, we are concerned with energy-
aware self-organizing networks that guarantee a satisfactory
performance. We consider satisfaction equilibria, mainly the
efficient satisfaction equilibrium (ESE), to ensure a target quality
of service (QoS) and save energy. First, we identify conditions
of existence and uniqueness of ESE under a stationary channel
assumption. We fully characterize the ESE and prove that,
whenever it exists, it is a solution of a linear system. Moreover, we
define satisfactory Pareto optimality and show that, at the ESE,
no player can increase its QoS without degrading the overall
performance. Under a fast fading channel assumption, as the
robust satisfaction equilibrium solution is very restrictive, we
propose an alternative solution namely the “long term satisfaction
equilibrium”, and describe how to reach this solution efficiently.
Finally, in order to find satisfactory solution per all users, we
propose fully distributed strategic learning schemes based on
Banach-Picard, Mann and Bush-Mosteller algorithms, and show
through simulations their qualitative properties.
Index Terms—Banach-Picard algorithm, Bush-Mosteller algo-
rithm, efficient satisfaction equilibrium, expected robust game,
game theory, long term satisfaction equilibrium, Mann iter-
ates, satisfaction equilibrium, self-organizing networks, ultra-
densification, 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Cisco visual network index (VNI) re-
port [1], the monthly global mobile data traffic has reached
3.7 exabytes in 2015, and is expected to increase nearly
eightfolds attaining 30.6 exabytes by 2020. In order to cope
with this sheer volume of data traffic, a natural move to the
next generation of wireless communication systems (5G) is
needed. This is achieved by involving key technologies [2],
[3] including networks ultra-densification. The main driver
behind ultra-densification is to substantially increase existing
macro-cellular networks capacity [4]–[6]. Ultimately, forecasts
predict that by the time 5G comes to fruition, there will be
more base stations (BSs) than mobile handsets [7].
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The growing number of BSs, typically low power nodes
(micro, pico, and femto base stations), also called Small-
Cells [8], gives rise to many new challenges. Especially, those
related to heterogeneity, optimization, and scaling. Clearly, as
the number of heterogeneous Small-Cells grows tremendously,
the amount of interferences will increase significantly [9]
leading to the so-called curse of dimensionality [10]. The
amount of data, that is exchanged between BSs in order to
handle interferences, raises exponentially with the number of
interfering BSs (dimensionality) resulting in a heavily loaded
network (mainly with signaling messages).
Self-organizing networks (SON) are by far the most im-
portant approach to rise above dimensionality issues related
to Small-Cells deployments [11]. Not only do self-organizing
networks enable to the network an automated resource man-
agement and improve BSs coordination, but SON can signif-
icantly reduce operators CAPEX (capital expenditures) and
OPEX (operating expenses), especially by reducing human
intervention and optimizing available resources.
However, as the number of low power nodes grows in-
creasingly, the overall energy consumption of Small-Cells base
stations cannot be ignored. A relevant amount of energy could
be saved [12], [13]. Mechanisms for energy-aware nodes are
more than desirable. SON should implement energy saving
techniques in order to prolong the lifetime of the batteries and
increase the energy efficiency.
In order to achieve energy efficiency, several techniques
such as sleep mode optimizations [14], power control mech-
anisms [15], and learning algorithms can be used. In this
work, we are interested in achieving energy efficiency through
a satisfaction mechanism. Practically, instead of achieving
the best network performance by maximizing QoS, which is
generally energy costly, nodes can only target satisfactory QoS
levels, and hence, work efficiently. The choice of satisfactory
QoS levels is merely endorsed by the two following reasons:
1) First, as the number of base stations is highly increasing,
probably overtaking the number of mobile devices in the
next few years, the average number of devices per cell
will decrease significantly. In such a context, optimization
based on the full buffer traffic assumption, i.e. the user
always asks for maximizing its QoS, cannot hold true.
Unfortunately, this case can lead to resource consuming
requests, while saving energy is possible without any
significant deterioration of the user-perceived rate [16].
2) Second, many mobile applications (e.g. real-time ser-
vices such as video conferencing and online gaming)
require only fixed data rates in order to run properly.
2Assuming additional QoS demand will convey wasteful
resources [17].
The main contribution of this paper is to present a novel
approach while dealing with energy efficiency in SON. Our
paper addresses the following questions: how to reach a target
QoS while minimizing energy consumption? Given a realistic
wireless framework, how to select the most efficient power
allocation that meets with users expectations?
A. Related work
To answer these questions efficiently and satisfactorily, a
game theoretical approach is adopted. Game theory provides
powerful tools [18] and gives clear insights on interacting
nodes behaviors.
One of the well-known game theoretical solution concepts
is the Nash equilibrium (NE). NE is a strategy profile where
no player has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. It has
been shown that the NE generally fails to model the network
performance. Indeed, when each player acts selfishly by in-
creasing its power, subsequent interferences increase driving
the network to a suboptimal situation.
Alternatively, in order to support the users QoS require-
ments, the constrained Nash equilibrium (CNE, also called
generalized Nash equilibrium) is introduced [19]–[21]. Partic-
ularly, constrained games are concerned with payoffs maxi-
mization (or minimization) subject to coupled and/or orthog-
onal constraints over the players strategies and/or payoffs.
Hence, at a CNE, each player aims at achieving its optimal
utility while satisfying QoS constraints. The CNE is designed
to accommodate with QoS requirements that the NE fails
to model. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, the
CNE can be a very restrictive solution that (i) reduces the
set of players strategies, and (ii) requires costly efforts. More
precisely, in order to reach the highest payoffs, greater efforts,
such as higher powers, are generally needed. This may lead to
a lower energy efficiency and cost effectiveness of the network.
Consequently, a less restrictive solution concept, namely
satisfaction equilibrium (SE), has been introduced [22], [23].
Mainly, in a less restrictive framework, players can only target
satisfactory QoS levels without aiming at achieving the highest
payoffs. At an SE, utilities optimization assumption is relaxed.
The payoffs should only be above given thresholds based on
users services requirements. Hence, (i) energy costs related to
payoffs maximization are saved, and (ii) players constraints
are satisfied. Note that the CNE can also be seen as an SE
of a satisfaction game, since players constraints are always
satisfied at a CNE [24]. Yet, the reverse is not necessarily
true.
The energy efficiency function was introduced by Meshkati
et al. in [25]. This function measures the performance of the
network per Joule of consumed energy. For each node, the
ratio: QoSConsumed energy is reduced. The work in [26] investigates
energy efficiency in ultra-dense networks through joint power
control and users scheduling. The problem of energy efficiency
maximization is formulated as a dynamic stochastic game and
cast as a mean-field game. The authors show that the mean-
field equilibrium saves energy and reduces outage probability.
In [27], the energy efficiency for multiple input multiple output
antennas heterogeneous networks is studied using a non-
cooperative and cooperative power control game. The authors
propose a power allocation algorithm in order to reach Pareto
optimal solutions.
Authors in [28] transform the energy efficiency problem
maximization to a power minimization problem. A power
allocation algorithm based on semidefinite programming is
therefore proposed to achieve energy efficiency. In [29], Lak-
shminarayana et al. are also interested in power minimization.
They present the problem of saving energy in Small-Cells
under time constraints. The impact of delayed information is
analyzed and a Lyapanov optimization is proposed.
Although game theory has been widely adopted to model
network dynamics, very little attention has been paid to satis-
factory solutions. In [24], Perlaza et al. investigate conditions
for existence of satisfaction equilibria in a general framework
of QoS provisioning in self-configuring networks. Authors also
study conditions for existence and uniqueness of efficient SE
(ESE). Sufficient conditions for convergence of distributed
algorithms that reach SE are presented by Meriaux et al.
in [23]. Authors in [30] present convergence analysis to an
SE, ESE, and satisfactory solutions that are not equilibria.
B. Contribution
In this work, we address the problem of energy-aware
user satisfaction in SON. Our main objective is to meet the
users requirements while reducing the energy consumption.
Accordingly, we aim at seeking for satisfaction equilibria,
mainly the ESE in both stationary and random channels
context.
For this paper, while we refer to earlier works [24] and [30],
the focus is different:
1) First, when the channels follow a slow fading model:
• we fully characterize the ESE while considering
information-theoretic transmission rate based mea-
sure, and prove that, whenever it exists, it is the
unique solution of a given linear system.
• We prove that satisfactory QoS levels and channel
states are correlated to the transmit powers. For a
desired QoS level, the users need to adjust their
powers according to their channel states. Specifically,
when the channel state decreases, the required trans-
mit power increases.
• We introduce “satisfactory Pareto optimality” prop-
erty and show that the ESE is satisfactory Pareto
optimal. Mainly, at the ESE, no user can increase
its payoff without dissatisfying its opponents.
2) Second, when the channels are fast varying over time:
• we define the “robust satisfaction equilibrium” and
introduce a novel solution concept, namely the “long
term satisfaction equilibrium”, which is less restric-
tive, and hence, more energy efficient.
• In order to achieve energy efficiency, we seek for
power allocations that minimize the channels vari-
ance while averagely respecting users requirements.
33) One of the main contributions of this paper is that we
propose fully distributed algorithms: (i) based on Banach-
Picard iterations in order to reach the ESE for continuous
power states and stationary channels, (ii) a modified
version of Banach-Picard referred to as “the progressive
Banach-Picard algorithm for capacity discovery” to reach
the maximum network capacity, (iii) an updated version
of Bush-Mosteller algorithm in order to converge to the
ESE when the channels are stationary and the power
states spaces are discrete, (iv) and Mann iterates based
algorithm for fast varying channels in order to reach the
efficient long term satisfaction equilibrium.
4) Finally, we show the qualitative properties of the pro-
posed algorithms through simulation results.
C. Structure
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the system model. Section III formulates
the problem as a satisfaction game under a stationary channel
assumption and describes some properties related to the set
of satisfacion equilibria. A full characterization of ESE is
also provided and the Pareto optimality property is studied. In
section IV, under channel randomness assumption, satisfactory
solutions are investigated. In section V, we present distributed
schemes in order to reach efficient solutions for both stationary
and random channels. Section VI presents numerical results to
illustrate the performance of the studied algorithms. Finally, in
the last section, we make a few concluding remarks. The proof
of proposition 4 is given in Appendix and important notations
are summarized in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a self-organizing network where N heterogeneous
mobile stations (MSs) communicate with a common concen-
tration point (e.g. a base station). We denote by U the set of
(MSs). Users operate over the same radio channel. The radio
channel is first supposed stationary, and, then, fast varying
within time. The channel is considered slow or fast varying
depending on the time the channel states change compared
to the coherence time. We denote by hi the power fading
gain between user i and the concentration point. Each user
selects its transmit power within a bounded power space that
we denote by P i. Each user i aims at guaranteeing a target
throughput θi. We denote by ri the bandwidth-normalized
instantaneous throughput of node i,
ri(P) = log2(1 + γi(P)), (1)
where γi denotes the instantaneous signal-to-interference-and-
noise-ratio (SINR) of user i,
γi(P) =
hiPi
η +
∑
j∈U\{i}
hjPj
, (2)
with P the power vector that encompasses all MSs transmit
powers. Pi is the power selected by user i, and η is the variance
of a Gaussian random variable that represents the additive
Gaussian noise.
Symbol Meaning
U set of MSs
N number of MSs
Pi power states space related to user i
P power vector, it belongs to
∏
i∈U
Pi
Pi power of MS i
γi instantaneous SINR related to MS i
η additive Gaussian noise
hi power fading gain between the concentration point and
user i
ri instantaneous throughput related to user i
r¯i expected throughput related to user i
θi target throughput related to user i
P t =
∑
j∈U
Pjhj the total received power at the
concentration point
Pmaxi maximum power allowed to user i
Eh1,...,hN
[.] the mathematical expectation with respect to the joint
random variable h1, . . . , hN .
C maximum network capacity
S set of ESE
TABLE I: Summary of notations
Under a fast fading channel assumption, only expected
throughput can be considered
r¯i(P ) = Eh1,...,hN [log(1 + γi(P ))] , (3)
where Eh1,...,hN [.] denotes the mathematical expectation with
respect to the joint random variable h1, . . . , hN .
The main notations of this work are summarized in Table I.
III. STATIONARY CHANNEL
Here, we suppose a slow fading channel. Specifically, the
channel remains constant during the coherence interval. Hence,
only instantaneous throughput.
A. Game formulation
Suppose the non-cooperative game
G = {U , {P i}i∈U , {ri}i∈U , {θi}i∈U} where U is the
set of players, P1, . . . ,PN are the sets of pure strategies
of each user.The payoff of each user i ri is given by its
throughput. We will separate the strategy of a node i, Pi,
and its opponents by using the following notation (Pi,P−i).
Each user i aims at achieving a minimum throughput θi.
Consequently, each user i is satisfied with its strategy Pi
given the others strategies P−i, if
ri(Pi,P−i) ≥ θi. (4)
B. Satisfaction equilibrium
In order to achieve satisfactory solutions, only a set of strate-
gies is allowed for each user given its opponents strategies. We
refer to these strategies as “feasible strategies”. Such a set can
be characterized by a correspondence function fi : P−i −→
2P
i
, where P−i = P i × · · · × P i−1 × P i+1 × · · · × PN , and
2P
i is the set of all subsets of P i. For each P−i ∈ P−i, if
Pi ∈ fi(P−i), then ri(Pi,P−i) ≥ θi. Accordingly, we define
the set of satisfaction equilibria as follows.
4Definition 1 (Satisfaction equilibrium). A strategy pro-
file P+ is a satisfaction equilibrium of a game G =
{U , {P i}i∈U , {ri}i∈U , {θi}i∈U}, if
∀i ∈ U , ∀P+i ∈ fi(P
+
−i), i.e., ri(P
+
i ,P
+
−i) ≥ θi. (5)
It is important to note that an SE exists, if there exists P+
that satisfies constraints (5), but also if the constraints are
feasible, mainly, if ∑
i∈U
θi ≤ C, (6)
where C is the maximum network capacity (which is also
solution to the rate-maximization problem as described [31]).
Hereafter, we assume the constraints feasibility and discuss
SE existence. The impact of constraints feasibility will be
discussed in section VI.
Proposition 1. For each i ∈ U , let P i = [0, Pmaxi ] be the set
of pure strategies of player i, Pmaxi is the maximum transmit
power value allowed to i.
Then, the set of SE of game G is convex, closed and bounded.
Proof:
• Convex: SE are solution to linear inequalities system,
each feasible region (inequality) is convex [32], and the
intersection of convex sets is convex.
• Closed: the closeness of the SE set stems from the soft
inequalities. Each inequality is a union of two closed half
planes, and the union and intersection of a finite number
of closed sets is a closed set.
• Bounded: this property holds true because the set of
power states is supposed bounded.
C. Efficient satisfaction equilibrium
We denote by S the set of SE. Whenever S is non-empty,
we define the efficient satisfaction equilibrium (ESE) concept
as provided in [24].
Definition 2 (Efficient satisfaction equilibrium). An SE P+ is
said efficient if it minimizes the efficiency function F (P) =∑
i∈U
Pi with P ∈ S.
The next corollary prove the existence of an ESE when the
set of SE is non-empty.
Corollary 1. If the set of SE of the game G is non empty, an
efficient satisfaction equilibrium exists.
Proof: The efficiency function F (P) = ∑
i∈U
Pi with P ∈ S
is convex with respect to P over the set of SE which is convex
and compact (Proposition 1). Hence a minimum of F exists.
Proposition 2 (ESE uniqueness and characterization). Let
P i = [0, Pmaxi ] be the set of pure strategies of player i.
Suppose the set of SE is non-empty. The ESE is unique and it
is the solution to the linear system ∀i ∈ U , ri(P) = θi.
Proof: Let P+ be the solution to the linear system, such
that ∀i ∈ U , ri(P+) = θi. We want to prove that P+ minimizes
the efficiency function F (P) =
∑
i∈U
Pi with P ∈ S.
Suppose by absurd that it exists P˜∈S such that∑
i∈U
P˜i <
∑
i∈U
P+i . (7)
We want to prove that under this assumption, there is at least
one player whose target throughput is not satisfied. Suppose
that we have for each i such that 1≤ i ≤N−1
ri(P˜) ≥ θi. (8)
In order to show that the requirement of the player N is
unsatisfied, meaning rN (P˜)<θN , it is sufficient to prove that
log2(1+
P˜NhN
η + P˜ t − P˜khk
)< log2(1 +
P˜NhN
η + P t+ − P+N hN
), (9)
with P t =
∑
i∈U
Pihi the overall received power at the concen-
tration point. In order to prove equation (9), it is sufficient to
prove that
P˜NhN
η + P˜ t − P˜NhN
<
P˜NhN
η + P t+ − P+N hN
. (10)
Or alternatively, it is sufficient to prove that
η(P˜N − P
+
N ) + P˜NP
t+ − P+N P˜
t < 0. (11)
Note that equation (11) is obtained after a few algebras from
equation (10). Important to note that ∀i, ri(P+) = θi. Hence,
using the same previous reasoning, equation (8) becomes,
∀1 ≤ i≤N − 1
η(P˜i − P
+
i ) + P˜iP
t+ − P+i P˜
t ≥ 0. (12)
By subsequent summation of inequalities described by equa-
tion (12) from i=1 to i=N−1, we obtain
η(P˜ t−P˜NhN−P
t++P+NhN)+P
t+(P˜ t−P˜NhN)−P˜
t(P t+−P+NhN)≥0.
(13)
After a few algebras, we obtain
η(P˜N − P
+
N ) + P˜NP
t+ − P+N P˜
t <
η
hk
(P˜ t − P t+). (14)
Since we supposed that
∑
i∈U
P˜i <
∑
i∈U
P+i , then P˜ t < P t+
(the total received power conserves the order as the channels
gain are stationary and the same for both received powers).
Thus,
η(P˜N − P
+
N ) + P˜NP
t+ − P+N P˜
t < 0 (15)
which is equivalent to say rN (P˜) < θN , and this is a
contradiction since P˜ is an SE. Thus,
∑
i∈U
P˜i >
∑
i∈U
P+i , and
P+ is the ESE.
Proposition 2 states that, whenever it exists, the ESE is met
when all players are barely enough satisfied. The obtained re-
sult confirms intuitive expectations since only minimal efforts
are needed to afford minimal satisfaction. Furthermore, the
Pareto frontier is exactly defined by the efficient satisfaction
5equilibrium. The next definition describes the Pareto efficiency
in satisfaction games.
Definition 3 (Satisfactory Pareto optimality). In a satisfaction
game, a strategy profile is Pareto optimal if no player can
increase its payoff without dissatisfying its opponents.
The following corollary arises from the definition above.
Corollary 2 (Pareto optimality). Suppose the set of SE is non-
empty and the power spaces are non-empty, convex and com-
pact sets. The ESE exists and is satisfactory Pareto optimal.
Proof: At the ESE, given the other players strategies,
if a player i decides to increase its payoff by increasing its
transmit power, the interferences increase, and thus all the
other players payoffs get deteriorated, mainly, they will be
under users requirements thresholds.
In order to reach their QoS requirements, users should adapt
their transmission powers according to their channel states.
We show, through the following proposition, the impact of the
channel state and the users demands on the powers decision-
making.
Proposition 3. Let P+ be the ESE of the game G. If, for users
i and j, θi ≤ θj , then P+i hi ≤ P
+
j hj .
Proof: The proof stems from the increasing nature of the
payoff functions. Indeed, for a given fixed power allocation of
i’s opponents, ri(Pi,P−i) is increasing with respect to Pi.
First, at the ESE, ri(P+i ,P
+
−i) = θi.
Suppose θi ≤ θj , therefore, for x ∈ P i, we have
g(x) = log2
(
1 +
x
η + P t − x
)
, (16)
with P t =
∑
j∈U
Pjhj . By deriving g(.) with respect to x, we
obtain
∂g(x)
∂x
=
η + P t + 2x
η + Pt − x
≥ 0. (17)
Hence, when
log2
(
1 +
P+i hi
η + P t − P+i hi
)
≤ log2
(
1 +
P+j hj
η + Pt − P
+
j hj
)
,
(18)
we have P+i hi ≤ P
+
j hj , which completes our proof.
Next, we provide an analytical expression of ESE under
existence conditions.
Proposition 4 (Full characterization of ESE). Let P i =
[0, Pmaxi ] be the set of pure strategies of player i. The ESE
of the game G exists if
{ N−1∑
i=1
hi(1− 2
θi)
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
2θjhj+hN
N−1∏
j=1
2θjhj 6= 0,
0 ≤ P+N ≤ P
max
N and P+i ≤ P
max
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
(19)
such that
{P+N = η(2θN − 1)N−1∑
i=1
hi
1−2θN
2θN hN
2θihi
1−2θi
+ hN
1−2θN
P+i =
1− 2θi
2θihi
2θNhN
1− 2θN
PN , 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
(20)
Specifically, P+N and P+i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 are the players
strategies at the ESE.
Proof: Due to its length, the proof is moved to the
Appendix A.
IV. RANDOM CHANNEL
In real wireless communication systems, the channel state
information (CSI) is aquired through training sequencies (pi-
lots). The CSI is estimated at the receiver and fed back to
the transmitter. Even though in time division duplex (TDD)
systems, the CSI can be estimated instantaneously at the
transmitter using the reverse channel, the CSI can be noisy, and
thus, it is best estimated statistically. Conversely, in frequency
division duplex (FDD) systems, the channel can only be
estimated statistically.
Furthermore, the assumption of perfect CSI is not grounded
in reality especially for fast fading channels where the chan-
nels vary faster than the coherence time, and delay should be
estimated.
Under realistic CSI assumptions, only expected throughput
can be used as described by equation (3).
Suppose G′ = {U , {P i}i∈U , {r¯i}i∈U , {θi}i∈U ,Eh1,...,hN [.]},
an expected robust game with {r¯i}i∈U as the players
expected utilities. The expected values are over the joint
random variables h1, . . . , hN which are supposed independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.). We assume that all the
channels are bounded and different from 0, this is a practical
assumption endorsed by the fact that radio channels take strict
positive values. Hence, we have the following assumption:
Assumption 1. ∀i ∈ U , 0 < hi ≤ hmax.
Under Assumption 1, we define the robust satisfaction
equilibrium (RSE).
Definition 4 (Robust satisfaction equilibrium). P∗ is called
a robust satisfaction equilibrium iff ∀0 < hi ≤
hmax, such that i ∈ U , ri(P∗) ≥ θi.
Hence, the RSE is a power allocation that enables to
the users to be always satisfied regardless the state of their
respective channels. The RSE is particularly distribution-free
since it does not depend on the channels states. It is worth
noting that when Assumption 1 is not satisfied, mainly, if
∃i ∈ U , hi = 0, all the strategies of player i will be
unfeasible, and hence the non-existence of an RSE.
Moreover, the existence of an RSE is a stringent condition
as it is very restrictive to find a power allocation that satisfies
all the players for all their channel states. At least, this
power allocation could not be efficient. Thus, we define a
less restrictive solution, namely the “long term satisfaction
equilibrium” (LTSE).
6Definition 5 (Long term satisfaction equilibrium). P+ is called
a long term satisfaction equilibrium if it is a solution to the
following problem{
min
P
Eh1,...,hN
[
(ri(P )− r¯i(P ))
2
]
,
subject to ∀ i ∈ U , r¯i(P ) ≥ θi.
(21)
Indeed, in order to achieve satisfaction, we seek for power
allocations that minimize the channels variance while aver-
agely respecting users requirements. This assumption is less
restrictive than instantaneous satisfaction where users should
be satisfied all the time.
Reducing variance V ar(ri(P )) =
Eh1,...,hN
[
(ri(P )− r¯i(P ))
2
]
ensures small instantaneous
throughput fluctuations around the expected throughput.
Furthermore, in order to ensure energy efficiency, the expected
throughput can be replaced by the users requirements. This is
important to avoid energy wasting solutions that guarantee to
the users higher payoffs. Hence, the efficient LTSE is given
by the solution of the following problem:{
min
P
Eh1,...,hN
[
(ri(P )− θi)
2
]
,
subject to ∀ i ∈ U , r¯i(P ) = θi.
(22)
Another way to consider energy efficiency in a fully dis-
tributed fashion is to solve the following constrained problem:{
minimize Pi,
subject to ∀ i ∈ U , r¯i(P ) = θi. (23)
Proposition 5. Let P+ be the power allocation that minimizes
the transmit power of each user and exactly guarantees their
satisfaction (solution to the problem (23)), P+ also ensures
small variations around satisfactory levels (solution to the
problem (22)).
Proof: log2(.) is a Lipschizian function with respect to
Pi, therefore, ∃0 < k < 1, c ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ U
|ri(Pi,P−i)− θi|2 < (kPi + c)2. (24)
Consequently, ∃0 < k′ < 1, c′ ∈ R+
Eh1,...,hN
[
(ri(P)− θi)2
]
< (k′Pi + c
′)2, (25)
Accordingly, when the transmit powers are reduced,
Eh1,...,hN
[
(ri(P)− θi)2
]
is reduced as well, which completes
our proof.
Next, we define the probability of meeting a satisfactory
equilibrium P(∃P |r(P) ≥ θ) as described in the following
equation
P(∃P |r(P) ≥ θ) = P{∃P ∈
∏
i∈U
P i, ∀ i ∈ U , ri(P) ≥ θi}.
(26)
In a random context, in order to meet satisfactory equilibria
very frequently, the probability P(∃P |r(P) ≥ θ) is to be
maximized.
Proposition 6. Let P(∃P |ri(P ) ≥ θi) be the probability to
meet an LTSE, therefore
P(∃P |ri(P ) ≥ θi) ≤ min(1,
V ar(ri(P ))
(θi − r¯i(P ))2
), (27)
Proof: According to the extended version of the Cheby-
shev’s inequality for monotonically increasing functions,
P(∃P |ri(P ) ≥ θi) ≤
Eh1,...,hN (Ψ(ri(P )))
Ψ(θi)
, (28)
with
Ψ(ri(P )) = (ri(P )− r¯i(P ))
2
. (29)
By replacing equation (29) in equation (28),
P(∃P |ri(P ) ≥ θi) ≤
V ar(ri(P ))
(θi − r¯i(P ))2
. (30)
Equation (30) shows that the probability of meeting an SE is
bounded by V ar(ri(P ))(θi−r¯i(P ))2 , mainly, by minP
V ar(ri(P ))
(θi−r¯i(P ))2
.
Hence,
P(∃P |ri(P ) ≥ θi) ≤ min(1,
V ar(ri(P ))
(θi − r¯i(P ))2
), (31)
which completes our proof.
V. FULLY DISTRIBUTED SATISFACTION
In this section, we propose distributed schemes in order to
reach the satisfaction efficiently for different cases: stationary
channels and continuous power space, capacity discovery for
stationary channels and continuous power space, stationary
channels and discrete power spaces, and random channels and
continuous power spaces.
A. Learning for stationary channels
1) Banach-Picard algorithm: In order to reach the ESE
under the stationary channels assumption and continuous
power spaces, we propose a distributed learning scheme de-
scribed by the Banach-Picard algorithm, also called “fixed
point iterations”. The Banach-Picard algorithm is known to
be convergent with a geometrical rate to the solution of the
equation w(x) = x [33]. In order to converge to the unique
fixed point of w(.), function should be contractive. In our
case, we suppose w(x) = x
θi
ri(x,P−i), which is a contractive
function. Notice that when the fixed point is reached, mainly
x
θi
ri(x,P−i) = x, we obtain, ri(x,P−i) = θi (we suppose that
the fixed point is different from zero otherwise nodes cannot
target their satisfactory QoS levels).
The Banach-Picard algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
7Algorithm 1 Banach-Picard algorithm
1: Parameters initialization
Each user picks randomly a transmit power with initial
probabilities vector P 0i
2: repeat
3: Learning pattern
4: for Each user i do
Observe the value of its instantaneous throughput
rti(P
t
i ,P−i)
Update its power as follows:
P t+1i ← P
t
i
θi
rt
i
5: until The stopping criterion
P ti is the power of user i at instant t, and rti(P ti ,P−i) is the
throughput of player i at instant t when its opponents choose
P−i. The stopping criterion can be formulated as “all players
have reached their target throughput”. It can also be described
by P ti convergence rate: when
∣∣P t+1i − P ti ∣∣ < ρ, with ρ goes
to zero, the algorithm stops.
It is important to note that Banach-Picard algorithm, and all
the algorithms we propose in this section, are fully distributed
since no information about the other players strategies, their
throughput, or channels states is needed. Players need only to
observe their own payoffs in order to pick up the best strategy
efficiently.
2) Progressive Banach-Picard algorithm for capacity dis-
covery: When achieving the best performance is more impor-
tant than energy consumption, an adapted version of Banach-
Picard algorithm, referred to as the progressive Banach-Picard
algorithm for capacity discovery, can be used. Indeed, in the
capacity discovery algorithm, once a user’s request (demand)
is reached, the user increases its demand slightly, and ad-
justs its power accordingly in order to reach its new target.
This process allows to the users to maximize their payoffs
reaching a constrained Nash equilibrium (maximizing their
payoffs subject to their initial requirements constraints) and
avoiding any under-utilization of the network. The progressive
Banach-Picard algorithm for capacity discovery is described in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Progressive Banach-Picard algorithm for capac-
ity discovery
1: Parameters initialization
Each user picks randomly a transmit power with initial
probabilities vector P 0i
2: repeat
3: Learning pattern
4: for Each user i do
Observe the value of its instantaneous throughput
rti(P
t
i ,P−i)
P t+1i ← P
t
i
θi
rt
i
5: if θi is reached and
∑
i
θi < C then
Update its demand as follows:
θi ← θi + ǫ
6: until The stopping criterion
where the parameter ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is the throughput step size.
3) Adapted Bush-Monsteller algorithm: In order to reach
an SE in a distributed fashion under stationary channels
assumption and discrete power spaces, we propose a mod-
ified version of the Bush-Monsteller Algorithm [34], [35]
referred to as “Adapted Bush-Monster algorithm”. The Bush-
Monsteller Algorithm is a well-known algorithm that con-
verges to an NE. The modified version we propose reaches
to the ESE of game G.
The adapted Bush-Monsteller algorithm is based on a
stochastic approximation approach. Nodes should update their
strategies following a probability distribution in order to learn.
In the algorithm we propose, probabilities are updated with
respect to the response of the environment. We denote by pik
the probability that MS i chooses the power level k (we
suppose a discrete power space with a given fixed number
of power levels for each user P i = {P 1i , . . . , Pmaxi }). Power
strategies and utilities are suffixed by t to refer to their values
at time step t. The probabilities are calculated as follows
pt+1bk =


ptik − ζ
|θi−rti(Pt)|
maxt′≤t(|θi−ri(Pt
′
)|)
ptik if Pi 6= P ki
ptik + ζ
|θi−rti(Pt)|
maxt′≤t(|θi−ri(Pt
′
)|)
∑
k′ 6=k
ptik′ otherwise
,
(32)
where ζ is a parameter in [0, 1] also called the step size of
the probability updating rule. The results of the algorithm are
more accurate when ǫ is close to zero [34]. ζ can be different
from a player to another in order to allow heterogeneous
learning speed.
Hence, adapted Bush-Monsteller iterates as described in 3:
Algorithm 3 ELRI algorithm
Parameters initialization
1: Each user picks randomly a power level with initial
probabilities vector p0ik
2: repeat
Learning pattern
3: for Each user i do
4: for Each power state k do
5: if Pi 6= P k then
6: pt+1ik ← p
t
ik − ζ
|θi−rti(P
t)|
mt
7: else
8: pt+1ik ← p
t
ik + ζ
|θi−rti(P
t)|
mt
∑
k′ 6=k
ptik′
9: Update mt
10: if
∣∣θi − rti(Pt)∣∣ > mt then
11: mt+1 ←
∣∣θi − rti(Pt)∣∣
12: until The stopping criterion
It is to be noted that the adapted Bush Monsteller will
converge to the ESE only if it starts near from the ESE and
does not meet an NE on its trajectory, otherwise it would be
trapped in an NE.
8B. Learning for random channels
When the channels are random, particularly when they are
fast varying over time, we would like to track the efficient
LTSE online. In contrast to the stationary case, the learning
process cannot be based on the instantaneous throughput only.
Players should estimate their throughput at each iteration and
adjust their estimated throughput accordingly. Furthermore,
when the channel fading is fast, the estimated throughput is
not a contractive function since it depends on both powers
and channel states. Consequently, the classical Banach-Picard
updating rule cannot ensure convergence to the fixed point.
To deal with this matter, Mann iterates are proposed [36].
Mann iterates modify Banach-Picard updating rule by taking
an average on the previous power state and the Banach-
Picard rule. This learning process, as described in 4, is proved
to converge to the fixed point for functions that are not
necessarily contractive.
Algorithm 4 Mann iterates for random channels
1: Parameters initialization
Each user picks randomly a transmit power with initial
probabilities vector P 0i
rˆ0i (P
t
i ,P−i) is initiated
2: repeat
3: Learning pattern
4: for Each user i do
Update its power as follows:
P t+1i ← (1 − λ)P
t
i + λP
t
i
θi
rˆt
i
Forecast the expected value of its throughput
rˆt+1i (P
t
i ,P−i)= rˆti(P ti ,P−i)+µ(rˆti(P ti ,P−i)−rti(P ti ,P−i))
5: until The stopping criterion
with (λ, µ) ∈ [0, 1]2 enough small in order to achieve
convergence. Notice that when λ = 1, the Mann iterates
coincide with Banach-Picard algorithm.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
Here, we turn to present some representative simulations by
which we validate our analysis and show the performance of
the proposed algorithms.
A. QoS requirement and channel gain effects
First, we suppose stationary channels and continuous power
states spaces. We use Banach-Picard algorithm to reach the
ESE. Consider Fig. 3 which depicts the transmit power evolu-
tion and subsequent throughput for each user. As the channel
gain is supposed fixed (hi = 1 for all i), final power decisions
(Fig. 3 (a)) follow the QoS requirements. For example, user 3,
who is the most demanding among users, transmits with the
highest power. This remark is supported by Proposition 3
which states that the received powers order follows the users
requirements order. It can also be seen from Fig. 3 (b) that
the final throughput of each user matches perfectly its initial
demand. Besides, the ESE is met in only a few ten iterations.
Notice that the some of transmit powers is set to the minimum
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Fig. 1: QoS requirement effect. Figure (a) represents the transmit powers decision
evolution over time for 3 users. The resulting throughput is given by Figure (b).
The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum network capacity
C = 10.
at the end of the iterations which goes in the same direction
with our prediction: the ESE minimizes the sum of transmit
powers among all the satisfaction equilibria.
Similarly, in Fig. 2, we suppose that the QoS requirements
(users demands) are fixed, and notice that the transmit powers
order is inverted when compared to the channel gains order.
This is explained by Proposition 3, and is also intuitively
expected: the noisier the channel state is, the more transmit
power is needed to reach the satisfaction levels. The figure
shows also that the users requirements are exactly met by the
end of the iterations, and the energy cost is optimized.
B. Adapted Bush-Monsteller algorithm
When the channel states are stationary and the power
levels are discrete, one can use the adapted Bush-Monsteller
algorithm in order to reach the ESE. Consider Fig. 4 which
depicts the algorithm convergence for 3 users. From this
figure, it can be seen that each player reaches its throughput
requirement after a given number of iterations. It is to be noted
that as the power states space is discrete, powers that exactly
match the users requirements may not exist, and thus, users
requirements are reached approximately. Mixed strategies can
also be tracked by an adjustment in the learning pattern
of the proposed algorithm using the Linear Reward Penalty
algorithm [35].
Fig.5 describes the probabilities of choosing a given power
level for MS 1. Clearly, as final power decision of the user is
P1 = 0.1, the probability to choose P1 = 0.1 converges to 1,
and the other probabilities that are related to the other power
states fail to 0.
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Fig. 2: Channel gain effect. Figure (a) represents the transmit powers decision evolution
over time for 3 users. The resulting throughput is given by Figure (b). The starting power
allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum network capacity C = 10.
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Fig. 3: QoS requirement effect. Figure (a) represents the transmit powers decision
evolution over time for 3 users. The resulting throughput is given by Figure (b).
The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum network capacity
C = 10.
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(a) Throughput of user 1
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(c) Throughput of user 3
Fig. 4: Throughput convergence to the target demand while using adapted Bush-
Monsteller algorithm. The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum
network capacity C = 10. The power states space are the same for all users, mainly
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3}.The final power allocation is (0.1, 0.2, 0.3)[mW ]
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Fig. 5: The adapted Bush-Monsteller algorithm probabilities related to user 1 with
respect to its possible power states {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. The starting power allocation is
(1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum network capacity C = 10.
C. Random channel
1) Stationary block channels: In this subsection, we sup-
pose that the channels remain stationary over a given coher-
ence time (a block) and change from one block to another. We
use Banach-Picard iterations to select among continuous sets
of powers the ESE. Here we highlight the tractable property
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Fig. 6: Stationary block channels. Channels vary every 10 iterations. Figure (a) represents
the transmit powers decision evolution over time for 3 users. The resulting throughput is
given by Figure (b). The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum
network capacity C = 10.
of Banach-Picard algorithm. For each time block, the users
requirements are reached. The channels states vary within
iteration blocks as it can be seen in Fig. 6.(b). The ESE is
tracked for each time block. Particularly, in Fig. 6.(a) the
powers are adjusted (lowered for the first time block of 10
ms) in order to meet the users demands in Fig. 6.(c). However,
these results can not hold true when the time block is shorter
than the convergence time of Banach-Picard algorithm.
2) Fast fading channels: In order to cope with fast varying
channels, Mann iterates algorithm is used. Fig. 7.(c) shows
that the algorithm reaches the efficient LTSE in long run
iterations. The variations around the users requirements are
barely canceled at the end of the iterations. Notice that
channels are completely random as depicted in Fig. 7.(b)
following an exponential distribution. The updated transmit
powers are stabilized at the end of the running time as it can
be seen in Fig. 7.(a).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 104
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
 
 
θ1=1
θ2=2
θ2=3
PSfrag replacements
Tr
an
sm
it
po
w
er
Elapsed time
(a)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
x 104
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
 
h1
h2
h3
PSfrag replacements
Ch
an
n
el
ga
in
Elapsed time
(b)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 104
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
 
MS1
MS2
MS_
θ1=1
θ2=2
θ3=3
PSfrag replacements
Ex
pe
ct
ed
th
ro
u
gh
pu
t
Elapsed time
(c)
Fig. 7: Random channel gains follow an exponential distribution of mean and variance
equal to 1. Figure (a) represents the transmit powers decision evolution over time for
3 users. The resulting throughput is given by Figure (c). Figure (c) gives the channels
variation over time. The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum
network capacity C = 10.
D. Algorithm recovery
Here, we turn to show the recovery property of Banach-
Picard iterations. By the recovery property, we mean the
algorithm ability to adapt its results when the environment
parameters change. Indeed, if a user changes its demand over
time a lower number of iterations should be needed in order
to return back to the ESE allocation. Fig. 8 shows that user
1 increases its demand at t = 20. This demand is quickly
satisfied and the algorithm converges rapidly, again, to the
new ESE.
E. Capacity discovery
Here, we are interested in maximizing the payoffs using the
progressive Banach-Picard algorithm for capacity discovery.
Fig. 9 plots the transmit powers and payoffs evolution within
time. It can be seen from the figure that users reach their
optimal payoffs by the end of the iterations. It is worth noting
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Fig. 8: Algorithm recovery. Figure (a) represents the transmit powers decision evolution
over time for 3 users. The resulting throughput is given by Figure (b). The first user
increases its demand at t = 20. The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and
the maximum network capacity C = 10.
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Fig. 9: Throughput maximization using the modified Banach-Picard algorithm. Figure
(a) represents the transmit powers decision evolution over time for 3 users. The resulting
throughput is given by Figure (b). The starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and
the maximum network capacity C = 14.
that the sum of their final requirements corresponds to the
maximum network capacity.
F. Constraints feasibility
In this section, we suppose, that the sum of initial users
requirements exceeds the network capacity. Fig. 10 depicts
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Fig. 10: Constraints feasibility. Figure (a) represents the transmit powers decision
evolution over time for 3 users. The resulting throughput is given by Figure (b). The
starting power allocation is (1, 1, 1)[mW ], and the maximum network capacity C = 3.
the users behaviors when their requirements (
3∑
i=1
θi = 6)
go beyond the network capacity (C = 3). Hence, the users
constraints are unfeasible (inequality (6) is not satisfied). It
can be seen from Fig. 10 (a) that users have to transmit
with an infinite power in order to reach their satisfaction
performance. Furthermore, even with the highest power levels,
users are not able to achieve their request as it is depicted in
Fig. 10 (b) where the final throughput of each user is below
its satisfaction. The aggressive behavior of users, particularly
transmitting with high powers, can be compared to the behav-
ior of prisoners’ dilemma players, in which the players behave
in discordance to what is expected.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a satisfaction equilibrium ap-
proach in order to reduce energy consumption for users in
self-organizing networks. We were mainly interested in the
efficient satisfaction equilibrium for both stationary and fast
fading channels. We showed that we studied conditions of
existence and uniqueness of ESE under a stationary channel
assumption and fully characterized the ESE by the solution
of a linear system. Moreover, we proved that at the ESE no
player can increase its QoS without degrading the overall
energy performance. When the channels are fast varying
over time the efficient long term satisfaction equilibrium
solution is proposed and characterized. In order to reach to
the efficient solutions, four fully distributed algorithms are
proposed, namely: Banach-Picard algorithm, the progressive
Banach-Picard algorithm for capacity discovery, the efficient
linear reward algorithm, and Mann iterates algorithm. The
convergence of the proposed algorithms is shown through
12
simulation results and their qualitative properties are described
are well.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION 4:
Proof: The ESE is the solution of the linear system of
equations:∀i ∈ U
ri(P) = θi. (33)
. The solution exists if
• The determinant is different from zero.
• The power solutions are positive.
• The power solutions do not exceed the maximum transmit
power allowed to each user.
First, we compute the determinant of the linear system. We
replace equation (1) in equation (33), after a few computations,
we obtain, ∀i ∈ U
Pihi − (2
θi − 1)
∑
j 6=i
Pjhj = (2
θi − 1)η. (34)
Let A be an N ×N matrix, such that A = (aij)1≤i,j≤N , with
aii = hi and for i 6= j aij = (1 − 2θi)hj
A=


h1 (1−2
θ1)h2 . . . (1−2
θ1)hN
(1−2θ2)h1 h2 . . . (1−2
θ2)hN
. . . . . . hi (1−2
θi)hN
(1−2θN )h1 (1−2
θN )h2 . . . hN

 .
Let B = diag1≤i≤N( 11−2θi )
B=


h1
(1−2θ1 )
h2 . . . hN
h1
h2
(1−2θ2)
. . . hN
. . . . . . hi
(1−2θi )
hN
h1 h2 . . .
hN
(1−2θN )


The determinant of B is given by
det(B) =
1
N∏
i=1
(1− 2θi)
det(A). (35)
Let C = TB with T = IN −
N−1∑
i=1
Ei,i+1, where IN is the
identity matrix, and Ei,i+1 is an elementary matrix where all
components are equal to 0 except the {i, i+ 1}th element.
C=


2θ1h1
(1−2θ1 )
−2θ2h2
(1−2θ2)
0 . . . 0
0 2
θ2h2
(1−2θ2)
−2θ3h3
(1−2θ3 )
. . . 0
0 0 2
θihi
(1−2θi )
−2θi+1hi+1
(1−2θi+1 )
0
0 . . . 0 2
θi+1hi+1
(1−2θi+1 )
0
h1 h2 . . . . . .
hN
(1−2θN )


.
Thus, we have
det(C) = det(B). (36)
From the computation of the determinant of C, it follows
det(B) =

N−1∑
i=1
hi
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
2θjhj
1− 2θj
+
hN
1− 2θN
N−1∏
j=1
2θjhj
1− 2θj

 ,
(37)
Finally,
det(A) =

N−1∑
i=1
hi
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
2θjhj
1− 2θj
+
hN
1− 2θN
N−1∏
j=1
2θjhj
1− 2θj

×
N∏
i=1
(1 − 2θi)
=
N−1∑
i=1
hi(1− 2
θi)
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
2θjhj+hN
N−1∏
j=1
2θjhj
6= 0.
(38)
The solution of the linear system is given by (extensive
computations are given in the appendix)
{ P+N = η(2θN−1)N−1∑
i=1
hi
1−2θN
2
θN hN
2
θihi
1−2θi
+
hN
1−2θN
P+i =
1−2θi
2θihi
2θN hN
1−2θN
PN .
(39)
It is worth mentioning that the sign of P+N is the same of P
+
i ,
the reason why we only condition P+N sign. The solution of
the system is accepted only if it fits into the power states set.
We solve the following linear system:
{ h1P+1 + · · ·+ (1−2θ1)hNP+N = η(2θ1 − 1)
(1−2θ2)h1P
+
1 + · · ·+ (1−2
θ2)hNP
+
N = η(2
θ2 − 1)
. . . = . . .
(1−2θN )h1P
+
1 + · · ·+ hNP
+
N = η(2
θN − 1)
(40)
We divide each ith line by η(2θi − 1),
{ h1(1−2θ1 )P+1 + h2P+2 + · · ·+ hNP+N = −1
h1P
+
1 +
h2
(1−2θ2 )
P+2 + · · ·+ hNP
+
N = −1
. . . = . . .
h1P
+
1 + h2P
+
2 + · · ·+
hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = η(2
θN − 1).
(41)
For the first N − 1 lines, we deduce the i+1th line from the
ith line, and we obtain
{
2θ1h1
(1−2θ1 )
P+1 +
−2θ2h2
(1−2θ2)
P+2 = 0
2θ2h2
(1−2θ2 )
P+2 +
−2θ3h3
(1−2θ3)
P+3 = 0
2θihi
(1−2θi )
P+i +
−2θi+1hi+1
(1−2θi+1 )
P+i+1 = 0
. . . = . . .
h1P
+
1 + h2P
+
2 + · · ·+
hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = η(2
θN − 1).
(42)
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We replace each ith line by the sum from the first to the
ith line,
{
2θ1h1
(1−2θ1 )
P+1 +
−2θN hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = 0
2θ2h2
(1−2θ2 )
P+2 +
−2θN hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = 0
2θihi
(1−2θi )
P+i +
−2θN hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = 0
. . . = . . .
h1P1 + h2P2 + · · ·+
hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = η(2
θN − 1)
(43)
By replacing in the last line, we find P+N
{
2θ1h1
(1−2θ1 )
P+1 +
−2θN hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = 0
2θ2h2
(1−2θ2 )
P+2 +
−2θN hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = 0
2θihi
(1−2θi )
P+i +
−2θN hN
(1−2θN )
P+N = 0
. . . = . . .
(
N−1∑
i=1
hi
1−2θN
2θN hN
2θihi
1−2θi
+ hN
1−2θN
)P+N = η(2
θN − 1).
(44)
Finally, we obtain,
{ P+N = η(2θN−1)N−1∑
i=1
hi
1−2θN
2
θN hN
2
θihi
1−2θi
+
hN
1−2θN
P+i =
1−2θi
2θihi
2θN hN
1−2θN
P+N .
(45)
Which completes our proof.
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